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et al.: Commercial LAW
Law
COMMERCIAL
I. EFFECT OF THE UCC ON COMMON-LAW NEGLIGENCE
CLAIMS AGAINST A DEPOSITARY BANK

In Flavor-Inn, Inc. v. NCNB National Bank' the South Carolina Court of
Appeals clarified the effects of sections 36-1132 and 36-3-4191 of the South
Carolina Commercial Code on common-law negligence claims against a
depositary bank. The court faced the issue of "whether, within the meaning
of [section] 36-1-103, an action under [section] 36-3-419 of the UCC for the
conversion of an instrument supplants an action for negligence arising from a
depositary bank's payment or acceptance for deposit of a check on an
unauthorized indorsement. "4 The court also addressed whether an award for
consequential compensatory and punitive damages under section 36-3-419 is
Addressing the primary issue, the court held "that the
appropriate.'
conversion action permitted by [section] 36-3-419 is a 'particular provision'
of the UCC that [pursuant to section 36-1-103] displaces the common law
action for the negligent acceptance for deposit of a check with an unauthorized
indorsement."6 On the issue of damages, the court held that section 36-3419(2) entitled the appellant to receive compensatory damages equal to the face
amount of the instrument, but the section did not allow for recovery of
consequential damages.' However, section 36-3-419 authorized recovery of
punitive damages. 8
Flavor-Inn involved an embezzlement scheme conducted by two
employees of Flavor-Inn, Inc. ("Flavor-Inn"). The employees fraudulently
indorsed checks made payable to Flavor-Inn with the company's rubber stamp.
Then they presented the checks for deposit into their personal accounts at
NCNB National Bank of South Carolina ("NCNB"). 9

Flavor-Inn made several claims against NCNB based on both the common
law and the South Carolina Code. The claims included a claim for conversion
under section 36-3-419 and two negligence claims: one for common-law
negligence and one alleging NCNB's negligence in conducting its duties as a

424 S.E.2d 534 (Ct. App. 1992).
1. _ S.C.,
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-103 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
3. Id. § 36-3-419.
4. Flavor-Inn, _ S.C. at _, 424 S.E.2d at 535 (footnote omitted).
5. Id. at _, 424 S.E.2d at 535.
6. Id. at_, 424 S.E.2d at 536 (citing Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States
v. Okey, 812 F.2d 906, 909-10 (4th Cir. 1987)).
, 424 S.E.2d at 537.
7. Id. at
, 424 S.E.2d at 537.
8. Id. at
, 424 S.E.2d at 535.
9. Id. at
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collecting bank under section 36-4-202.1° In conjunction with these causes

of action Flavor-Inn sought consequential, compensatory, and punitive
damages. The trial court struck both negligence claims, focusing on the
section 36-3-419 conversion claim, and it struck the consequential and punitive
damage claims."
On appeal the court upheld the trial court's conclusion that section 36-3419 subsumes a common-law claim for negligent acceptance of a check with
an unauthorized indorsement for payment or deposit.' 2 The court also upheld
the striking of the claim for consequential damages, but reversed the denial of
punitive damages.'"
The court of appeals began its analysis of Flavor-Inn's appeal by
construing the relationship of sections 36-1-103 and 36-3-419.14 The FlavorInn court followed the reasoning set forth by the Fourth Circuit Court of

Appeals in EquitableLife Assurance Society of the United States v. Okey.15

10. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-4-202 (Law. Co-op. 1976). Section 36-4-202 outlines the basic
responsibilities of a collecting bank. The court did not address the negligence claim based upon
this section because Flavor-Inn failed to preserve the issue for appeal. Flavor-Inn, - S.C. at
-, 424 S.E.2d at 536.
11. Flavor-Inn, _ S.C. at _,

424 S.E.2d at 535.

12. Id. at __, 424 S.E.2d at 536. The court refused to address the § 36-4-202 negligence
claim because when the circuit court does not explicitly rule on a particular argument and the
party fails to make a S.C. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion to amend or alter judgment for failure to
address the issue, then the appellate court cannot properly address the issue. Id. at _, 424
S.E.2d at 536 (citing Noisette v. Ismail, 304 S.C. 56, 58, 403 S.E.2d 122, 124 (1991)).
13. Id. at _,

424 S.E.2d at 537.

14. Section 36-1-103 provides: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this act, the
principals of law and equity... shall supplement its provisions." S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-3-103
(Law. Co-op. 1976). Likewise, § 36-3-419 provides:
(1) An instrument is converted when
(c) it is paid on a forged indorsement.
(3) Subject to the provisions of this act concerning restrictive indorsements a
representative, including a depositary or collecting bank, who has in good faith and
in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards applicable to the business of
such representative dealt with an instrument or its proceeds on behalf of one who was
not the true owner is not liable in conversion or otherwise to the true owner beyond
the amount of any proceeds remaining in his hands.
Id. § 36-3-419.
15. 812 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1987) (applying South Carolina's version of the UCC). Charles
Okey III, an insurance agent for Equitable Life, personally indorsed customer checks made
payable to Equitable Life and deposited them in his personal account at First National Bank of
South Carolina. Okey then remitted part of each check to Equitable Life and embezzled the
remainder which approximated $1.4 million. Id. at 907. The factual similarities between Okey
and Flavor-Innplace Okey directly on point.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss1/4
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The Flavor-Inncourt reasoned that section 36-3-419(1)(c) fell within the
auspices of section 36-1-103, thereby displacing Flavor-Inn's common-law
negligence claim.' 6 Following Okey, the court justified this rationale by
recognizing that the "reasonable commercial standards" language in section
36-3-419(3) encompasses the due care element of a negligence claim in an
unauthorized indorsement deposit situation. 7 Therefore, the action for
conversion under section 36-3-419 effectively subsumed the common-law
negligence claim.' 8
The court next turned to the damages available as a consequence of its
dismissing the negligence claim. First upholding the trial court's conclusion
that section 36-3-419 disallowed consequential daniages,' 9 the court discussed
damages actually recoverable in the section 36-3-419 conversion action."
Section 36-3-419(2) provides that in a conversion action the measure of
liability other than a drawee's liability "is presumed to be the face amount of
the instrument."21 The plain language of this provision indicates that a
conversion action permits recovery of compensatory, not consequential,
damages. 9 Because the suit was against NCNB as a depositary bank, the
court presumed that compensatory damages equalled the face amount of the
instrument.20
The court recognized, however, Flavor-Inn's right to seek punitive
damages as a matter of law, and consequently, reversed the trial court's
decision on that issue. 2' According to section 36-1-106(1), "penal damages
may [not] be had except as specifically provided in this act or by other rule of
law." 22 Applying section 36-1-103, the court reasoned that no "particular
provision" of South Carolina's common code displaced the "principal of law"
entitling Flavor-Inn to recover punitive damages.' Instead, the "other rule
of law" regarding punitive damages, the common law, applies and supplements
the UCC.24 The supplemental principal of law recognized and applied by the
16. Flavor-Inn, _ S.C. at _, 424 S.E.2d at 536.
17. Id. at __, 424 S.E.2d at 536 (citing Okey, 812 F.2d at 908).
18. Id. at _,
424 S.E.2d at 536 (citing Okey, 812 F.2d at 908).
19. Id. at__, 424 S.E.2d at 537.
20. Id. at
, 424 S.E.2d at 536-37.
21. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-3-419(2) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
19. Flavor-Inn,_ S.C. at_, 424 S.E.2d at 537 (citing Patterson v. I.H. Servs., Inc., 295
S.C. 300, 310, 368 S.E.2d 215, 221 (Ct. App. 1988)).
20. Id. at _, 424 S.E.2d at 536-37. The presumption that damages equal the face amount
of the instrument arises only when a party sues the bank in a capacity other than as drawee.
Section 36-3-419(2) expressly provides that the face amount of the instrument is the measure of
a drawee's liability, but in "any other action" under this section, the measure of liability is only
presumed to be that amount. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-3-419(2) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
21. Flavor-Inn, _S.C. at _, 424 S.E.2d at 537.
22. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-106(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
23. Flavor-Inn, _S.C. at _,
424 S.E.2d at 537.
24. Id. at _, 424 S.E.2d at 537 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-106(1) (Law. Co-op.
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court in awarding punitive damages was the rule that " [p]unitive damages may
be recovered in South Carolina for a conversion, provided the defendant's
conduct has been malicious, wilful, reckless, or committed with a conscious
indifference to the rights of others."'
The Flavor-Inn conclusion that section 36-3-419 displaces common-law
negligence claims for payment on a forged instrument is a widely recognized
interpretation of section 1-103's relationship with section 3-419.26 However,
the opinion presents only a "bare-bones" analysis of why Flavor-Inn's
negligence claim cannot co-exist with a section 36-3-419(1)(c) conversion
claim. Other decisions reaching the same conclusion set forth a more in-depth

analysis.27
The analytical backbone of whether a section 36-3-419(1)(c) claim
subsumes a negligence claim lies in the interpretation of section 36-1-103,
which provides the standard for determining if a UCC provision displaces a
common-law cause of action. The conclusion in this decision arises from the
concept that common-law negligence and UCC conversion claims conflict in
three basic ways: (1) the overlapping nature of the two claims, (2) their
notions of due care, and (3) their defenses. 28
The ruling that Code conversion displaces a common-law negligence claim
for payment on a forged instrument is supported by an analysis and comparison of the nature of each individual theory. "[B]oth negligence and conversion require a consideration whether there was payment over an unauthorized
indorsement and evaluation of the reasonableness of the defendant's action." 2 9
Therefore, courts espousing the rationale followed by Flavor-Innconclude that
because the claims are so similar, the Code subsumes the common-law
30
theory.

1976)).

25. Id. at __, 424 S.E.2d at 537 (citing Oxford Fin. Cos. v. Burgess, 303 S.C. 534, 402
S.E.2d 480 (1991); Cox v. Coleman, 189 S.C. 218, 200 S.E. 762 (1939)).
26. See Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States v. Okey, 812 F.2d 906 (4th Cir.
1987); Berthot v. Security Pac. Bank, 823 P.2d 1326 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (adopting Okey's
reasoning); Florida Nat'l Bank v. Isaac Indus., Inc., 560 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(per curian) (finding Florida's conversion statute replaced the common-law action for
negligence), aff'd per curiam, 617 So. 2d 472 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Husker News Co. v.
South Ottumwa Says. Bank, 482 N.W.2d 404 (Iowa 1992) (recognizing the argument that the
UCC supplanted and annulled common-law negligence claims).
27. E.g., Okey, 812 F.2d at 908-11.
28. Id., at 909-10.
29. Id. at 909.
30. Cf. Robert A. Hillman, Constructionof the Uniform Commercial Code: UCC Section 1103 and "Code"Methodology, 18 B.C. INDUS. & COMM. L. REV. 655, 660-65 (1976) (analyzing
cases which resist abandoning "outside law" for the more direct Code laws), cited in Olcey, 812
F.2d at 909. Hillman believes that the underlying purposes of the UCC justify the conclusion
that section 3-419(1)(c) subsumes common-law negligence claims. Hillman, supra, at 678-85.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss1/4
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The conflict in the claims' treatment of the concept of due care also
supports Flavor-Inn'sconclusion. A common-law negligence claim requires
proving a lack of due care as a basic element of the cause of action, and the
plaintiff bears the burden of proof. 31 Conversely, in a Code conversion
claim, section 3-419 makes due care an element of the defendant's affirmative
32
defense; and therefore, the defendant bears the burden of proving due care.
In affirmatively defending that they acted in a reasonable manner, the
defendants must prove that they handled the instrument "in good faith and in
accordance with the reasonable commercial standards applicable to the
business of such [defendant]." 33 Courts often equate "reasonable commercial
standards" with due care.34 Consequently, the Code creates absolute liability
for a 3-419(1)(c) claim unless the defendant establishes due care and good
faith.35 Therefore, as recognized in Okey, the plaintiff in a common-law
negligence
claim would carry a greater burden of proof than the Code
intends. 36
Conflict between the two causes of action because of their differing
standards of proof also appears inthe inconsistent result obtained if both
causes are alleged and only one cause prevails. For example, if the commonlaw negligence claim prevailed, it would establish the defendant's failure to
use due care; with the 3-419(1)(c) conversion claim, the defendant would
establish that it acted with due care. 37 This inconsistency occurs because
although virtually identical, the claims allocate the burden of proving due care
differently.
The common-law negligence and Code claims also conflict regarding the
available defenses. Section 3-419(1)(c) creates absolute liability in the
defendant unless the defendant establishes the section 3-419(3) affirmative

He recognizes that because the UCC seeks to establish uniformity in commercial transactions, the
Code should displace the common law when both offer a method of recovery because the
common law may vary among states. Id.
31. Okey, 812 F.2d at 908.
32. Id. (citing Nat'l Bank v. RefrigeratedTransp. Co., 248 S.E.2d 496 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978)).
33. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-3-419(3) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
34. Okey, 812 F.2d at 908 (citing 6 RONALD A. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 3-419:35 (3d ed. 1981)); see also Berthot v. Security Pac. Bank, 823 P.2d 1326, 1329 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1991) (interpreting "reasonable commercial standards" to mean due care).
35. Okey, 812 F.2d at 909; see also Berthot, 823 P.2d at 1331 (imposing absolute liability
unless the bank can prove its own due care); Cartwood Constr. Co. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust
Co., 352 S.E.2d 241, 244 (N.C. Ct. App.) (imposing absolute liability for conversion), aff'd,
357 S.E.2d 373 (N.C. 1987).
36. Okey, 812 F.2d at 909.
37. Id. (discussing the confusion caused by two differing burdens of proof, which caused the
jury to reach inconsistent results). The court concluded that elimination of the common-law
negligence clause remedied the confusion. Id.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1993

5

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 4
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

defense of due care and good faith.3" Furthermore, because the comments
to the Code indicate that section 3-419 codifies common-law conversion,39
defendants cannot avail themselves of common-law defenses such as contributory or comparative negligence because these defenses were not recognized at
common law. 4" Conversely, in a common-law negligence action defendants
routinely assert either contributory or comparative negligence as a defense. 4'
The Okey court best summed up the reasoning of this conflict-based
analysis: "The cumbersomeness of dealing simultaneously with two causes of
action that incorporate the same elements under varying proof burdens, when
the only conceptual reason for considering both still viable is their somewhat
different measures of damages, convinces us that ... courts would find
displacement ...."42
Although section 36-3-419 still exists in South Carolina and many other
states,43 in 1990 the model version of the UCC modified section 3-419. The
remainder of section 3-419's provisions now appear in section 3-420 which
provides:
(a) The law applicable to conversion of personal property applies to
instruments. An instrument is also converted if it is taken by transfer,
other than a negotiation, from a person not entitled to enforce the
instrument or a bank makes or obtains payment with respect to the
instrument for a person not entitled to enforce the instrument or receive
payment. An action for conversion of an instrument may not be brought
by (i) the issuer or acceptor of the instrument or (ii) a payee or indorsee
who did not receive delivery of the instrument either directly or through
delivery to an agent or co-payee.
(b) In an action under subsection (a), the measure of liability is
presumed to be the amount payable on the instrument, but recovery may
not exceed the amount of the plaintiffs interest in the instrument.

38. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-3-419 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
39. Id. (South Carolina Reporter's Comments).
40. Okey, 812 F.2d at 910.
41. See id.
42. Id. at 911.
43. As of October 26, 1992, the following nineteen states had adopted the Revised Model
Code which contains § 3-420 (formerly § 3-419): Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida,
Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wyoming. John J.A. Burke,
Loss Allocation Rules of the Check Payment System With Respect to ForgedDrawerSignatures
and ForgedIndorsements:An Explanationof the Present andRevised UCCArticles 3 and 4, 25
UCC L.J. 318, 324 n.25 (1993). Presumably, most states will adopt the revision. Id. at 324.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss1/4
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(c) A representative, other than a depositary bank, who has in good
faith dealt with an instrument or its proceeds on behalf of one who was not
the person entitled to enforce the instrument is not liable in conversion to
that person beyond the amount of any proceeds that it has not paid out. 44
Subsection (a) of the new section 3-420 expands prior section 3-419(1)'s
definition of conversion. As the comments to the 1990 revisions indicate,
section 3-419(1) did not include all possible situations when conversion of an
instrument can occur, and section 3-420 corrects this problem by adopting the
personal property law of conversion for instruments.4' The new section 3420 also clarifies prior section 3-419 regarding conversion of unindorsed
instruments, conversion by multiple payees, causes of action by payees who
never received instruments against depositary or drawee banks, damages
available from drawees and other converters, and defenses available to
depositary banks. 46

The clarifications that section 3-420 imposes on former section 3-419
probably would not dictate a different result from the one reached by the
Flavor-Inncourt in a similar case. Section 3-420 appears to cover the primary
issue in Flavor-Inn-whethera depositary bank which paid on or accepted for
deposit a check with an unauthorized endorsement is liable for negligence.
The UCC's definition of conversion still covers the acceptance of a forged
check for payment or deposit by a bank in section 3-420(a).47 Therefore,
because section 1-103 of the Model Code remains unchanged, section 3-420
presumably subsumes common-law negligence claims as did its predecessor.
A provision of section 3-420 which might change the result in a FlavorInn scenario appears in subsection (a)(ii) which expressly prohibits a payee or
indorsee who did not receive delivery of an instrument from bringing an action
for conversion of the instrument.4" However, this prohibition is limited
because the payee or indorsee may receive delivery indirectly through its
agent. 9 Therefore, in a Flavor-Inn scenario the employees converting the
checks would be considered agents of the payee authorized to receive customer
checks. This indirect delivery would allow a section 3-420 conversion action.

44. U.C.C. § 3-420 (1993).
45. Id. cmt. 1.
46. Id. cmts. 1-3.
47. Id. cmt. 1. Subsections (a) and (b) of § 3-419(1) were deleted from the Model UCC;
however, the second sentence of § 3-420(a) encompasses subsection (c). Id. "Section 3-420(a)
... covers cases in which a depositary or payor bank takes an instrument bearing a forged
indorsement." Id.
48. Id. § 3-420(a)(ii). "An action for conversion ofan instrument may not be brought by...
(ii) a payee or indorsee who did not receive delivery of the instrument either directly or through
delivery to an agent or a co-payee." Id.
49. U.C.C. § 3-420 cmt. 1.
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Although the above application of agency theory answers the question of
delivery, the Revised Model Code section 3-405 sets forth a special provision
dictating an employer's responsibility for fraudulent indorsements made by
employees which adds a twist to the above analysis. Section 3-405 separates
employees into two groups: those who have responsibility with respect to
instruments and those who do not.50 If the employee has responsibility with
respect to instruments, then section 3-405 imposes strict liability on an
employer for a fraudulent indorsement made by the employee.5 Section 3405 identifies six groups of employees who have responsibility with respect to
instruments and lists them as those employees with authority
(i) to sign or indorse instruments on behalf of the employer, (ii) to process
instruments received by the employer for bookkeeping purposes, for
deposit to an account, or for other disposition, (iii) to prepare or process
instruments for issue in the name of the employer, (iv) to supply information determining the names or addresses of payees of instruments to be
issued in the name of the employer, (v) to control the disposition of
instruments to be issued in the name of the employer, or (vi) to act
otherwise with respect to instruments in a reasonable capacity. 2
Although this section imposes strict liability on the employer, subsection (b)
allows an employer to split the loss with the depositary bank if the bank failed
to exercise ordinary care in paying on the instrument, and this lack of care
contributed substantially to the loss by the employer.53
If the employee is not entrusted with the described responsibility then
section 3-405 does not apply.5 4 If section 3-405 does not apply then the issue
becomes whether or not the employer negligently retained the check. If the
employer was not negligent, then the employer may claim forgery by the
employee and bring an action for conversion under section 3-420. Therefore,
in a Flavor-Innsituation the court must determine whether the employee who
forged the indorsements on the checks falls into one of the section 3-405
categories. If so, then the employer incurs strict liability for the amount lost,
or at least part of it, and the result will differ from that reached in Flavor-Inn.
50. See id. § 3-405(a)(3); see also Burke, supranote 43, at 372 (discussing the impact of the
revisions).
51. Id.
52. U.C.C. § 3-405(a)(3); see also Burke, supranote 43, at372-73 (discussing § 3-405(a)(3)).
53. U.C.C. § 3-405(b); see also Burke, supra note 43, at 373-74 (discussing an employer
sharing the loss with a negligent bank).
54. Section 3-405(a)(3) gives specific examples of when it does not apply. "'Responsibility'
does not include authority that merely allows an employee to have access to instruments or blank
or incomplete instrument forms that are being stored or transported or are part of incoming or
outgoing mail, or similar access." U.C.C. § 3-405(a)(3).
55. See ANDERSON, supra note 34, § 3-405:1 cmt. 1.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss1/4
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However, if the employee does not fall in one of the section 3-405 categories,
then the result will likely approximate that in Flavor-Inn, unless the employer
negligently retained the check.
Section 3-420(b) changes the standard for calculating the amount of
damages. In former section 3-419 the measure of liability was presumably the
face amount of the instrument, while in section 3-420 "the measure of liability
is presumed to be the amount payable on the instrument."56 This change in
language will not likely affect a Flavor-Inn type case because no difference
exists in the application of the two standards when the instrument is a check.
The change was made to clarify situations in which the instrument converted
was interest bearing or declared other amounts due.57 Because a Flavor-Inn
scenario deals only with converted checks, which usually do not involve
interest, "the amount payable on the instrument" will likely remain "the face
value of the instrument."
The South Carolina Court of Appeals in Flavor-Inn, following the Fourth
Circuit's lead in Okey, reinforced the logical reasoning behind the denial of a
plaintiff's common-law negligence claim when a section 3-419 conversion
claim is'simultaneously made. Although section 3-419 of the South Carolina
Commercial Code no longer reflects the Model Uniform Commercial Code's
provision on conversion, many states still follow the pre-revised version of
Article 3. However, nineteen states have adopted the Revised Model Code
with more expected to follow. If South Carolina adopts the Revised Model
Code provision on conversion, courts will likely still reach the same result that
the Court of Appeals reached in Flavor-Innunless section 3-405 applies, in
which case the employer would incur strict liability for at least part of the loss
depending upon the level of care of the depositary bank.
Elizabeth Anne Holley
II. COURT ADDRESSES THE REGULATION OF MANUFACTURERS,
DISTRIBUTORS, AND DEALERS ACT

In Taylor v. Nix' the South Carolina Supreme Court held: (1) the
Regulation of Manufacturers, Distributors, and Dealers Act ("the Act") 2 is
constitutional; (2) the lessees of an automobile were entitled to double and
treble damages as provided under the Act; and (3) the Act allowed recovery

56. U.C.C. § 3-420(b).
57. Id. cmt. 2.
1. 307 S.C. 551, 416 S.E.2d 619 (1992).
CODE ANN. § 56-15-10 to -360 (Law. Co-op. 1991).

2. S.C.
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of attorney's fees, although the attorney did not itemize the bill into the
relative time spent on the statutory cause of action.3 In Taylor the lessees of
an automobile sued the lessor and the manufacturer, claiming breach of
warranty, strict liability in tort, and violation of the Act.' The decision
proves significant because it is one of the few South Carolina decisions
interpreting the Act, and the court takes an expansive view of the Act's
applicability and amount of damages recoverable.
The plaintiffs, Kathy and Glenn Taylor, leased with an option to buy a
Porsche 928S from the defendants. Shortly thereafter, the Taylors discovered
numerous problems and defects with the automobile, including the following:
a water leak in the hatchback; the presence of exhaust fumes in the passenger
compartment; heat radiating from the console between the two front seats; a
leaky sun roof; a faulty alarm system; defective speakers; and the failure of
the rear wipers, interior lights, and rear hatch release.' The uncontested
testimony of Ms. Taylor revealed that she took the car to the dealer approximately fourteen times in the twenty-six months the Taylors possessed the
automobile, and the dealership never fully corrected the defects. The Taylors
then met with two Porsche representatives who also failed to remedy the
problems. Further, the Taylors complained of the unprofessional conduct of
the service personnel and representatives. 6 In the original lawsuit, the Taylors
named Nix V.W., Inc. ("Nix"), Porsche Cars North America, Inc.
("Porsche"), and various other defendants, seeking damages stemming
primarily from a failure to repair the automobile in a proper, timely, and
professional manner.7
The trial court submitted the case to the jury on theories of breach of
warranty, strict liability in tort, and violation of the Act. After finding a
malicious violation of the Act, the jury returned a plaintiffs' verdict awarding
both actual damages and treble damages-the maximum punitive damages
allowed under the Act.' The total verdict amounted to $80,500.00 to which
the court added $15,903.50 in attorney's fees and $2,563.10 in costs. 9 Nix
and Porsche appealed. 10

3. Taylor, 307 S.C. at 555-57, 416 S.E.2d at 621-22.
4. Id. at 553, 416 S.E.2d at 620.
5. Id. at 553 & n.1, 416 S.E.2d at 670 & n.1.
6. The Taylors complained of being joked about, laughed at, and avoided by the service
personnel and the Porsche representatives. Id. at 554, 416 S.E.2d at 621.
7. Id. at 551-55, 416 S.E.2d at 619-21. The other named defendants included Marine
Midland Automotive Corporation, Auto Recovery Bureau, Inc., and Sam Price. Id. at 551, 416
S.E.2d at 619. These defendants settled before the verdict on various claims unrelated to the
issues on appeal. See Brief of Respondent at 1 n. 1.
8. Taylor, 307 S.C. at 555, 416 S.E.2d at 621.
9. Brief of Respondent at 2.
10. Taylor, 307 S.C. at 553, 416 S.E.2d at 620.
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First, the appellants challenged the Act as being unconstitutionally vague
because it failed to define the term "arbitrary.""
In finding the Act
constitutional, the court recognized that although not defined in the Act,
"arbitrary" is readily definable, and thus not unconstitutionally vague. 2
The South Carolina Supreme Court has previously upheld the South
Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act ("UTPA") as not -unconstitutionally
vague.'" However, at least one commentator argues otherwise and points out
that the UTPA allows treble damages with no prior judicial order for violation
of a facially broad statute. 4 The combination of these factors raises the
possibility that a person or business may act in good faith and still receive a
punitive fine.' 5 Although the Act differs from the UTPA, the concerns that
Mr. Norton expresses with the UTPA are applicable to the Act because the
Act encompasses a wide range of conduct and allows both treble damages and
double actual damages with no prior judicial order. 6
Before assessing the constitutionality of the Act, it would appear that the
court should have discussed whether the Taylors could properly avail
themselves of remedies provided by the Act. The court neglected to
specifically address two issues: (1) whether the Act provides a remedy to
consumers, and (2) whether the lease with an option to purchase falls within
the purview of the Act.
The Act appears to be based on the Federal Automobile Dealers Day in
Court Act ("Automobile Dealers Act"). 17 Although the Automobile Dealers
Act seeks to balance the playing field between automobile dealers and
manufacturers,1 8 it does not contemplate consumer recovery.' 9 The early

11. Id. at 555, 416 S.E.2d at 621.
12. Id. ("Arbitrary conduct is readily definable and includes acts which are unreasonable,
capricious or nonrational; not done according to reason or judgment; depending on will alone."
(citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 104 (6th ed. 1990))). The court found the lower court's
definition of "arbitrary" ("not governed by any fixed rules or standards") too narrow to apply
to the conduct of motor vehicle dealers. The lower court took its definition from Deese v. South
Carolina State Board of Dentistry, 286 S.C. 182, 332 S.E.2d 539 (Ct. App. 1985). Although
the supreme court recognized the usefulness of this definition in reviewing administrative agency
decisions, the court determined that it was not appropriate for motor vehicle dealers, noting that
"[m]otor vehicle dealers are not required to deal with their customer guided solely by fixed rules
and standards." Taylor, 307 S.C. at 556, 416 S.E.2d at 621.
13. Inman v. Ken Hyatt Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 294 S.C. 240, 363 S.E.2d 691 (1988).
14. See Albert L. Norton, Jr., The South CarolinaUnfair TradePracticesAct and the VoidFor-VaguenessDoctrine,40 S.C. L. REv. 641, 666 (1989).
15. Id.
16. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-15-110 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
17. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1988).
18. See DeCantis v. Mid-AtlanticToyota Distribs., Inc., 371 F. Supp. 1238, 1241 (E.D. Va.
1974) ( "Mhe [Automobile Dealers] Act's ultimate purpose is to curtail the effects of any
coercion and intimidation which automobile manufacturers may be able to impose on their retail
dealers by virtue of the manufacturers' superior economic position." (citing Barney Motor Sales
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case of Superior Motors, Inc. v. Winnebago Industries, Inc.2" refers to the
Act's original version as a "South Carolina franchise law,"' thereby
supporting the contention that the statutory scheme initially expressed no
intention to provide consumers with a cause of action. The SuperiorMotors
court stated: "Although the title suggests a broader scope, the act purports to
regulate only motor vehicle sales and business dealings."22 The appellants
in Taylor argued that Superior Motors suggested that the legislature merely
intended for the Act to apply to dealings between automobile dealers and
manufacturers.' In Adams v. Gran 4 and Riddle v. Pitts,'s South Carolina
courts have affirmed jury awards for consumers under the Act; however,
neither appeal directly raised the issue of the Act's applicability to consumers.
Section 56-15-80 of the Act lists the agreements to which the Act applies.
The section applies to "agreements between a manufacturer, wholesaler or
distributor with a motor vehicle dealer, "26 but it does not mention the
applicability of the Act to consumer agreements. However, consumer
recovery under the Act seems predicated on the language of sections 56-15-40
and 56-15-110. Section 56-15-40(1) makes it a violation for a "motor vehicle
dealer to engage in any action which is arbitrary, in bad faith, or unconscionable and which causes damage to any of the parties or to the public." 27
Further, section 56-15-110(1) provides that "any person who shall be injured
in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in this chapter may
sue therefor in the court of common pleas."28
The Taylor court further expanded the Act to apply to a lease with an
option to purchase. This decision conforms with the ruling in Southern
NationalLeasing Corp. v. Hall2 9 which held that South Carolina's UTPA did
in fact cover automobile leases. 3" The Hall court noted that although section
56-15-10(1) lacks a specific reference to leases, the definition of "sale" 3 is

v. Cal Sales, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 172, 175 (S.D. Cal. 1959))).
19. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1988).
20. 359 F. Supp. 773 (D.S.C. 1973).
21. Id. at 776.
22. Id.
23. Brief of Appellant at 10.
24. 292 S.C. 581, 358 S.E.2d 142 (Ct. App. 1986).
25. 283 S.C. 387, 324 S.E.2d 59 (1984).
26. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-15-80 (Law. Co-op. 1991).

27. Id. § 56-15-40(1).
28. Id. § 56-15-110(1).

29. 306 S.C. 92, 410 S.E.2d 577 (Ct. App. 1991).
30. Id. at 93-94, 410 S.E.2d at 578; see also supra text accompanying notes 13-16.
31.
"Sale," shall include the issuance, transfer, agreement for transfer,
exchange, pledge, hypothecation, mortgage in any form, whether by transfer
in trust or otherwise, of any motor vehicle or interest therein or of any
franchise related thereto; and any option, subscription or other contract, or
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expressed in broad terms. 32 By reading this section together with sections
56-15-20"3 and 56-15-40(5)." the court found that the definition of sale
encompasses a lease."5
To recover under the Act, the plaintiff must establish arbitrary, bad faith,
or unconscionable conduct by the defendant.3 6 The Taylors' suit stemmed
primarily from the repeated failure to repair the vehicle and the insensitive and
unprofessional conduct of the service personnel and representatives. The
application of the Act under these circumstances deserves a degree of scrutiny.
Two recent South Carolina cases reject the contention that conduct
arguably similar to that complained of in Taylor violated South Carolina's
UTPA. In Key Co. v. Fameco Distributors,Inc.37 the court held that a mere
breach of contract, even if intentional, fails to constitute an unfair trade
practice.38 Additionally, in Clarkson v. Orkin Exterminating Co. 9 the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that mere failure to repair is not unfair
trade practice.4" The court stated:

solicitation, looking to a sale, or offer or attempt to sell in any form,
whether spoken or written. A gift or delivery of any motor vehicle or
franchise with respect thereto with, or as, a bonus on account of the sale of
anything shall be deemed a sale of such motor vehicle or franchise.
S.C. CODE ANN.

§ 56-15-10(I) (Law. Co-op. 1991).

32. Hall, 306 S.C. at 93, 410 S.E.2d at 578.
33. Section 56-15-20 provides:
Any person who engages directly or indirectly in purposeful contacts within this
State in connection with the offering or advertising for sale or has business dealings
with respect to a motor vehicle within this State shall be subject to the provisions of
this chapter and shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State upon
service of process in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 9 of Title 15.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-15-20 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
34. Section 56-15-40(5) provides:
There is hereby created the Office of Administrator, within the Attorney
General's office, and he shall appoint such personnel within his office for the purpose
of regulating this chapter. The Administrator shall have the power to investigate,
issue cease and desist orders and injunctive relief on any valid abuse connected with
the sale, rental or leasing of a new or used motor vehicle;provided, however, this
power shall only apply after reasonable attempts by the consumer have been made
with the seller, dealer, manufacturer or lessor of the motor vehicle to alleviate the
complaint.
Id. § 56-15-40(5).
35. Hall, 306 S.C. at 94, 410 S.E.2d at 578.
36. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-15-40 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
37. 292 S.C. 524, 357 S.E.2d 476 (Ct. App. 1987).
38. Id. at 526-27, 357 S.E.2d at 478 (citing Atlantic Purchasers, Inc. v. Aircraft Sales, Inc.,
705 F.2d 712 (4th Cir. 1983) and Chancellors Racquet Club v. Schwarz, 661 S.W.2d 194 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1983)).
39. 761 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1985).
40. Id. at 191.
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There is no support in South Carolina law for the proposition that a
service persbn violates the unfair trade practice statute if he performs his
job poorly or overlooks something which should have attracted his
attention. An explicit or implicit representation that he performed his job
properly, if the fault is negligence or inattention, is simply not the kind of
deceptive practice the statute was intended to reach. 4'
Although the UTPA differs from the statutory scheme in the Regulation
of Manufacturers, Distributors, and Dealers Act, 42 the underlying reasoning
of the above two decisions remains relevant to the Act. That is, to benefit
from favorable damages provisions under the statutory schemes, the plaintiff
must establish something more than a mere breach of warranty or failure to
repair.
However, in Taylor the trial court seemingly relied on the express
language of the Act and found the defendants guilty of arbitrary and malicious
conduct. Taylor gives no indication of when unfriendly service and failure to
properly repair warrant a finding of arbitrary conduct. In fact, the ability of
a court to sufficiently define "arbitrary" conduct for the jury seems questionable. For example, in ERISA cases courts have observed that juries cannot
43
adequately apply an "arbitrary" conduct standard.
The Taylor court's ruling regarding the damages allowable under the Act
also merits attention. In addition to violations of the Act, the Taylor's alleged
breach of warranty and strict liability in tort. The court noted that "only
damages incurred as a result of the conduct in violation of [the Act] are
recoverable and subject to doubling and punitive damages."' The trial court
failed to instruct the jury to determine what damage resulted from the
defendants' violation of the statute.4' The court ruled this charge erroneous,
but concluded that the defendants suffered no prejudice.46 Therefore, the
court's decision indicates that it determined that all of the damages resulted
from conduct in violation of the statute.
Next, the court found sufficient evidence to support a finding of malice,
thus triggering the punitive damages provision and authorizing treble actual

41. Id.
42. See supratext accompanying notes 13-16. In Columbia (SC) Teachers Fed. Credit Union
v. Newsome Chevrolet-Buick, Inc., 303 S.C. 162, 399 S.E.2d 444 (Ct. App. 1990), the court
referred to the Act as the "Motor Vehicle Dealers Unfair Trade Practices Act." Id. at 163, 399
S.E.2d at 445.
43. See, e.g., Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003 (4th Cir. 1985). The Berry court
stated that "[tihe significance of the [arbitrary and capricious] standard, while second-nature to
a judge, is not readily communicated to jurors." Id. at 1006-07.
44. Taylor v. Nix, 307 S.C. at 556, 416 S.E.2d at 622 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-15-110
(Law. Co-op. 1991)).
45. Id.
46. Id.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss1/4
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damages.47 The court found that the 95 m.p.h. test drive and the acts by the
servicemen of ignoring, avoiding, joking about and laughing at the Taylors
when they took the car in for service supported a finding of malice."a
Apparently, the trial court deemed these identical acts "arbitrary," thus
rendering the Act applicable in this case. Unfortunately, the court's
interpretation makes it difficult to distinguish between a finding of malice and
a finding of no malice in a breach of warranty action. Arguably, any breach
of warranty action will trigger the malice provision of the Act.
Finally, the court affirmed the award of attorney's fees under section 5615-110(1) of the Act.49 However, fees related to the nonstatutory causes of
action were excluded. Therefore, the trial court correctly deducted an amount
that represented time spent on actions against other defendants who settled
prior to the trial. The dispute regarding allowable attorney's fees arose
because the breach of warranty, strict liability, and statutory claims all related
to the same transaction and conduct. The court held that "no allocation of
attorney's services need be made except to the extent counsel admits that a
portion of the services was totally unrelated to the statutory claim or it is
shown that the services related to issues which were clearly beyond the scope
of the statutory proceeding." 50
The South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Taylor allows consumer
recovery under the Regulation of Manufacturers, Distributors, and Dealers Act
for a failure to properly and professionally repair a leased automobile in a
timely manner. The Act proves very attractive to plaintiffs by allowing an
award of double actual damages, treble actual damages as punitive damages,
.and attorney's fees. However, the Act proves troubling to defendants because
of the potential for broad application. Finally, because this decision is one of
the few South Carolina cases interpreting the Act, no clear guidelines exist
regarding when application of the Act is appropriate.
Mark L. Richardson

47. Id. at 556-57, 416 S.E.2d at 621-22. "In an action for money damages, if the jury finds
that the defendant acted maliciously, the jury may award punitive damages not to exceed three
times the actual damages." S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-15-110(3) (Law. Co-op. 1991).
48. Taylor, 307 S.C. at 556-57, 416 S.E.2d at 622.
49. Id. at 557, 416 S.E.2d at 622.
50. Id. (citing Heindel v. Southside Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 476 So. 2d 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985)).
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III. LENDER LIABILITY: EXPRESS TERMS OF A CONTRACT
VERSUS THE IMPLIED OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH

In FirstFederalSavings & Loan Ass'n v. Dangerfield' the South Carolina
Court of Appeals held that a commercial lender does not breach implied
obligations of good faith and fair dealing simply because it does not take
discretionary action that would lessen the liability of a guarantor in default of
a loan. Although this decision departs from the holding of the landmark
federal case, K.M. C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co. ,2 it does not significantly depart
from the historical practice of South Carolina courts. In addition, the
Dangerfield decision conforms to the growing national trend not to find a
breach of an implied obligation of good faith when the parties follow the
express terms of a commercial contract.3
InDangerfield, First Federal Savings and Loan Association filed an action
against Clyde Dangerfield, John Watkins, and Margaret Bivens, seeking to
1. 307 S.C. 260, 414 S.E.2d 590 (Ct. App. 1992).
2. 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985). "The most significant decision in the field of lender
liability is the 1985 decision of the Sixth Circuit in K.M. C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co.... [which]
first gave the lending community the message that lenders have an underlying obligation to deal
in good faith with their borrowers, regardless of the strict terms of the loan agreements their
lawyers drafted." HELEN D. CHAIAN, THE LAW OF LENDER LIABILITY 4.01 (1990).
In K.M. C., Irving Trust Company refused to advance $800,000 to K.M.C. even though the
advance would not have overdrawn K.M.C.'s $3.5 million line of credit. Being a wholesale
retail and grocery business, K.M.C. contended that Irving's refusal without notice to advance the
requested funds caused the collapse of K.M.C. "as a viable business entity." 757 F.2d at 754.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's finding that "there is implied
in every contract an obligation of good faith" which may impose upon the lender a duty to give
notice before refusing to advance funds under a loan agreement. Id. at 759. (citing U.C.C. § 2309 cmt. 8 (1989) ("mhe application of principles of good faith and sound commercial practice
normally call for such notification of the termination of a going contract relationship as will give
the other party reasonable time to seek a substitute arrangement.")).
For a discussion of the implied obligation of good faith which denounces the K.M.C.
decision, see Mark Snyderman, Comment, What's So GoodAbout Good Faith? The Good Faith
Performance Obligation In Commercial Lending, 55 U. CHi. L. REV. 1335 (1988) (calling
K.M.C. "a prototypical example of a hard case making bad law").
3. "In the recent boom of lender liability litigation, borrowers have attempted to impose on
lenders obligations that are contrary to explicit contractual provisions." David M. Schiffman,
LenderLiability Claims Die in Circuits, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 28, 1992, at 23. However, a number
of courts have estopped borrowers from denying lenders the right to enforce the terms of their
contracts. Id. Claims against lenders which courts have recently rejected include alleged lender
duties to "negotiate in good faith over a borrower's proposal to repay only a portion of a loan
... release collateral or subordinate liens if its loan would still be adequately secured ...
exercise reasonable forbearance following a default ... continue extending credit while its
borrower is in default, if it has done so in the past ... provide a loan even if a borrower has not
satisfied minor conditions precedent set forth in the loan commitment ... [and] act reasonably
when deciding whether to make additional advances under a discretionary line of credit, or when
deciding whether to renew an expiring loan." Id.
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collect on the guaranty agreements executed by each as shareholders of the
borrower, a company named "A Professional Moving and Storage of
Charleston, Inc." ("the Company"). Dangerfield, Watkins, and Bivens's
husband, Joseph, were the principal incorporators of the Company. While
both Dangerfield and Bivens leased equipment to the Company, only
Dangerfield contributed capital to the business. 4
After incorporating the Company, Dangerfield and Watkins, as officers
of the Company, met with the vice president of First Federal to obtain a loan.
First Federal granted the Company two loans based on personal guaranties
from the stockholders as well as a security interest in the leased equipment.
The Company was the primary obligor on all of the personal guaranties, and
the terms of the guaranties continued until either the obligation was retired or
the guarantors provided written notice of termination to First Federal.5
Less than one month after the issuance of the loan, Joseph Bivens
informed First Federal of improprieties by the Company's officers involving
the loan funds. He reported that the Company improperly disbursed loan
funds to an unrelated business in Greenville, and also made several large
payments to Dangerfield and Watkins. Joseph also requested First Federal to
discontinue additional loan payments to the Company to prevent further loss.
Despite this request, First Federal continued to make loan disbursements to the
Company and even granted an extension of the loan payment to the Company
after Dangerfield and Watkins announced their intentions to either sell or
discontinue the Company. Eight months after the issuance of the loan and two
days after the extension, the Company filed for bankruptcy, and the legal
action ensued. 6
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of First Federal, and
Bivens appealed. Addressing three issues in Dangerfield, the South Carolina
Court of Appeals affirmed. The issue with the greatest impact on lender
liability law was whether First Federal, once informed of improprieties with
the loan funds, breached the implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing
by failing to exercise its contractually authorized discretion to locate and
safeguard the loan collateral. Such safeguarding would have reduced Bivens's
share of liability after the loan default.7

4. 307 S.C. at 261-62, 414 S.E.2d at 591.
5. Id. at 262, 414 S.E.2d at 592.
6. Id. at 263-64, 414 S.E.2d at 592-93.
7. Id. at 266, 414 S.E.2d at 594. The other two issues the court addressed were: (1) whether
Bivens was liable on her guaranty even though the loan documents incorrectly listed the
Greenville company as the borrower instead of the Charleston company; and (2) whether the
Bivenses' oral communications to First Federal served as a sufficient revocation of the guaranty
agreement prior to the final disbursal of the loan funds when the agreement expressly called for
a written revocation. Id. at 264-65, 414 S.E.2d at 593-94.
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In a short explanation, the court of appeals held that First Federal did not
breach any implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing by not locating
and safeguarding the Company's collateral after learning of the alleged
improprieties by the corporate officers.'
The court relied on Bivens's
guaranty, which stated:
First Federal shall retain the right from time to time, without further notice
to or consent of the undersigned, to deal with all or any of the Obligations,
and any collateral or security thereof, as First Federal may deem advisable
in its sole discretion .... The rights granted to First Federal hereunder
shall be cumulative with all other rights of First Federal and First Federal
may select and assert its remedies against the undersigned, or any other
maker, endorser or guarantor of the Obligations or against any security or
collateral therefor.'
The court found that the guaranty gave First Federal the power to obtain
payment from the guarantors without first pursuing collection against the
Company's collateral. Although Bivens maintained that First Federal breached
an implied duty, the court stated that First Federal merely did "what the
contract expressly permitted it to do." ° Citing only to a 1979 Georgia case
that neither party briefed or argued, the court of appeals ruled that "[tihere is
no breach of an implied covenant of good faith where a party to a contract has
done what the provisions of the contract expressly gave him the right to
do.""
A survey of South Carolina case law reveals that its courts have
encountered little opportunity to address the issue of an implied good faith

8. 307 S.C. at 267, 414 S.E.2d at 594.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. (citing Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of Am. v. Anderson, 257 S.E.2d 283 (Ga. 1979)).
In Automatic Sprinkler, the court addressed the issue of "whether good faith is a
prerequisite in the exercise of an absolute discretion to withhold incentive compensation" in an
employment contract. 257 S.E.2d at 284. The Georgia Supreme Court stated:
Mhe [court of appeals] recognized "the time honored rule that where a decision is
left to the discretion of a designated entity, the question is not whether it was in fact
erroneous, but whether it was in bad faith, arbitrary or capricious so as to amount to
an abuse of that discretion." The decision continues, however, by citing one of the
most basic rules of contract construction. "What the intent of the parties was in
making the contract must control; it is possible to so draw a contract as to leave
decisions absolutely to the uncontrolled discretion of one of the parties and in such
a case the issue of good faith is irrelevant." There can be no breach of an implied
covenant of good faith where a party to a contract has done what the provisions of
the contract expressly give him the right to do.
Id. (quoting MacDougald Constr. Co. v. State Highway Dep't, 188 S.E.2d 405, 406 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1972) (citations omitted)).
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obligation in commercial contracts. With the exception of Commercial Credit
Corp. v. Nelson Motors, Inc. ,2 South Carolina courts have declined to find
an implied good faith obligation and instead have chosen to uphold the express
terms of the contract.
In Commercial Credit the South Carolina Supreme Court recognized an
implied obligation of good faith in a commercial contract even though the
contract did not provide specific terms describing the duties of the parties.
The court estopped the finance corporation, Commercial Credit Corp.
("Commercial Credit") from recovering its loss on certain contracts and
mortgages securing the credit portion of the purchase price of cars sold by
Nelson Motors, Inc. ("Nelson Motors"). Furthermore, the court found that
the finance corporation did not act in good faith in carrying out its discretionary contractual powers.
Under the contract, Nelson Motors would assign security instruments to
Commercial Credit upon the sale of cars from its dealership. During the first
ten years of the contract, the parties agreed that in the event of default by a
buyer, Commercial Credit could recover its loss after repossession by sale
back to the dealership. The dealership would purchase the repossessed
automobiles from funds held in a reserve account, but held no obligation to
Commercial Credit for losses beyond the funds available in the account.' 3
An affidavit of Commercial Credit's Columbia office manager also alleged the
following: "From the course of dealings between Nelson Motors, Inc. and
Commercial Credit Corporation over these years, any security instrument that
was sold to, and purchased by, Commercial Credit was with the understanding
that Commercial Credit Corporation would look after the collection of the
installments due on these instruments."14
Three years before Commercial Credit filed suit against Nelson Motors,
the parties supplanted their contract with a new agreement obligating Nelson
Motors to pay out-of-pocket any net loss Commercial Credit suffered after
depletion of the Nelson Motors reserve fund.' 5 Based upon the terms of this
new contract, Commercial Credit sued Nelson Motors for a deficiency
payment. Nelson Motors denied liability for Commercial Credit's deficiencies
claiming that Commercial Credit failed to collect the balances of the security
instruments with the same care and diligence it previously employed.' 6
Although the court found that the contract did not expressly impose upon
Commercial Credit an obligation to service and collect the assigned accounts,

12. 247 S.C. 360, 147 S.E.2d 481 (1966).
13. Id. at 364, 147 S.E.2d at 482.
14. Id. at 365, 147 S.E.2d at 483.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 363, 147 S.E.2d at 482. Nelson Motors' answer "allege[d] that the losses sustained
by Commercial were caused by its failure to perform its obligations in these respects." Id.
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the court found that an implied covenant of good faith exists in every
contract. 7 Consequently, the court ruled:
Without going into further detail, we are satisfied that under the terms of
the contract in the light of surrounding circumstances, including the
relationship of the parties and their past dealings, it is, to say the least,
fairly arguable that Commercial was impliedly obligated to pursue8 the
collection of the accounts with reasonable and customary diligence.'
In Rock Hill NationalBank v. Honeycutt,'9 the South Carolina Court of
Appeals declined to find a breach of an implied obligation of good faith when
a lender exercised its discretion under the Bankruptcy Act and Rules and voted
against a plan of reorganization, despite the guarantor's contention that if the
bank had not voted against the proposed plan, all creditor debts would have
been satisfied. Honeycutt, the guarantor of a note, filed for Chapter Eleven
bankruptcy on behalf of the borrower, Mac-Fab. During the bankruptcy
proceeding, Honeycutt proposed a "plan of arrangement" for Mac-Fab
whereby he would sell the corporation to a ready and willing buyer. 20
Honeycutt alleged that the majority of the relevant unsecured corporate
creditors approved the plan until the bank voted against it. The bank's
negative vote forced Mac-Fab into involuntary liquidation which provided for
only a portion of the company's outstanding debt. 2'
As a defense in the ensuing foreclosure action, Honeycutt asserted that the
bank should be precluded from enforcing its guaranty because it voted against
the proposed plan and thereby prevented Mac-Fab from realizing funds that
would have enabled it to pay all of its creditors in full.2" Moreover,
Honeycutt also argued that the plan would have eradicated the need to enforce

17. ConnercialCredit Corp., 247 S.C. at 366-368, 147 S.E.2d at 483-84. The court found
that the contract conferred "unlimited authority on Commercial to deal with the obligors, without
releasing Nelson, and provide[d] no opportunity for Nelson to protect its own interest by
stimulating payments." Id. at 369, 147 S.E. at 483.
18. Id. at 369, 147 S.E.2d at 485.
19. 289 S.C. 98, 344 S.E.2d 875 (Ct. App. 1986). Although the court's opinion does not
indicate that the defendant alleged breach of an implied obligation of good faith, this issue arises
when the lender is given discretion to act pursuant to the terms of a commercial contract. "If a
lender has discretion over a particular issue relating to a contract, the lender's good faith in
determining that issue may be questioned. When the lender's discretion is such that the
reasonable expectations of the borrower may be frustrated, the good faith of the lender will
undoubtedly be questioned." CHAITMAN, supra note 2, 4.03[l]. While Honeycutt does not
present a good faith issue under a loan instrument, a court might find the discretion given a bank
in a foreclosure proceeding analogous, thereby creating an implied obligation of good faith.
20. Honeycutt, 289 S.C. at 100, 344 S.E.2d at 876.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 105, 344 S.E.2d at 879.
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the bank's guaranty against the company. However, the court of appeals
rejected Honeycutt's argument by stating: "As we see it, the bank simply
exercised the discretion granted it under the Bankruptcy Act and Bankruptcy
Rules in voting against the plan. Moreover, it defies logic that the bank would
vote against a 'sure plan' which would have paid in full all of its indebtedness. 23
In another South Carolina Court of Appeals case, PPGIndustries, Inc. v.
OrangeburgPaint & Decorating Center, Inc. ,24 the South Carolina Court of
Appeals declined to find an implied obligation of good faith to give notice
when a written continuing guaranty agreement was silent as to whether the
creditor must "notify the guarantor of each additional extension of credit to the
guarantor's principal."' The court held that the plaintiff-creditor was under
no obligation to notify the defendant-guarantor of the additional extension of
credit to the debtor because there was no specific provision in the guaranty
requiring such notice.26
In PPGIndustries,Leonard Sanford ("Sanford") incorporated Orangeburg
Paint & Decorating Center, Inc. ("Orangeburg Paint") and personally signed
a guaranty for extensions of credit by a supplier, PPG.27 The guaranty
extended to all sales and deliveries of PPG products, but it did not provide for
notice to Sanford of orders made by Orangeburg Paint.2" PPG sued to
enforce the guaranty agreement against Sanford. Sanford denied liability for
credit extensions beyond the initial shipment of goods to the store because
PPG did not notify him of the additional credit extensions. 29
The court relied upon American Jurisprudence to find that a notice
provision must be bargained for in a guaranty agreement between a creditor

23. Id. The court also noted that the record was completely devoid of any evidence about the
feasibility of the proposed plan. Id.
24. 297 S.C. 176, 375 S.E.2d 331 (Ct. App. 1988).
25. Id. at 182, 375 S.E.2d at 334 (finding this issue to be a question of law). Again, there
is no indication in the opinion that an implied obligation was alleged by the defendant. However,
courts have found an implied obligation of good faith to give notice even when the express terms
of the contract do not so provide. See K.M. C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 759 (6th
Cir. 1985) (finding an obligation to give notice although the lender argues "that an implied
requirement that the bank provide a period of notice before discontinuing financing up to the
maximum credit limit would be inconsistent with the provisions in the agreement that all monies
loaned are repayable on demand").
26. PPG Indus., Inc., 297 S.C. at 183, 375 S.E.2d at 334.
27. Id. at 178, 375 S.E.2d at 332.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 183, 375 S.E.2d at 334. The guaranty agreement signed by Sanford contained a
box filled in with an "X," indicating that the guaranty provided for all sales and deliveries of
products to Orangeburg Paint. Sanford claimed that the box was not filled in with an "X" when
he signed the contract; however, he further admitted that he did not read the agreement prior to
signing it. Id. at 178, 375 S.E.2d at 332.
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and debtor.3" Finding this to be the majority view, the court adopted it "as
the law of South Carolina."I' Accordingly, the court held that PPG was not
obligated to notify Sanford of the continued credit extensions because the
contract did not require notice to the guarantor as a prerequisite to the
extensions.32
Finally, in Nantahala Village, Inc. v. NCNB National Bank,33 a case
decided after Dangerfield, the Fourth Circuit refused to find a breach of the
common-law duty of good faith implicit in promissory agreements executed
between a lender and borrower. Instead, the court upheld the lower court's
determination that the bank's conduct was not unconscionable because the loan
documents expressly permitted its conduct.34
In Nantahala Village, Robert Riedel, the president and principal

shareholder of Nantahala Village, Inc. ("Nantahala"), obtained a loan from
NCNB National Bank of Florida ("NCNB") on behalf of the resort. Nantahala
provided NCNB with "a deed of trust on the resort and a security interest in
certain personal property located at the resort."" Both prior to and subsequent to the resort loan agreement, Riedel obtained several other short-term
loans from NCNB in order to make loans to Nantahala for its operating
expenses,36 thereby establishing a course of dealing between the two. 37 In
addition, NCNB allowed modification of the loan agreement when Nantahala
had difficulty meeting its obligations.38
NCNB instituted a foreclosure action against Nantahala when Nantahala
defaulted on the loan. In addition, NCNB sold Riedel's NCNB stock to satisfy
his current line-of-credit obligations and to obtain additional security on
30. Id. at 182, 375 S.E.2d at 334. "'[R]ecent cases have concluded that in a continuing
guaranty, notice of the transactions occurring between the debtor and creditor is purely one [sic]
of express contract, and-in the absence of a specific provision requiring notice-the creditor has
no obligation to advise or to notify the guarantor.'" Id. (quoting 38 AM. JUR. 2D Guaranty § 99
(1968)).
31. PPGIndus., Inc., 297 S.C. at 183, 375 S.E.2d at 334.
32. Id.
33. (In re Nantahala Village, Inc.), 976 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1992).
34. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant breached both a common-law and statutory duty
of good faith. Id. at 877; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-203 (1986) (imposing an obligation
of good faith on contract performance covered by the code).
35. Nantahala Village, Inc., 976 F.2d at 878. In addition, the president and his wife
personally guaranteed payment of the Nantahala debt to NCNB. Id.
36. Id. Riedel secured a personal line of credit from NCNB to provide for Nantahala's offseason needs with 9,000 shares of his NCNB stock, worth $468,000. Id.
37. A good faith notice issue can arise when a lender participates in a course of dealing with
the borrower inconsistent with the express terms of the loan agreement. Courts differ as to
whether to require that the lender notify the borrower when it disregards the course of dealing
and begins to strictly adhere to the express terms of the agreement. See CHArrMAN, supra note
2, at 4.03[3][b].
38. NantahalaVillage, Inc., 976 F.2d. at 878.
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Nantahala's loan. 9 Subsequently, Nantahala instituted an action against
NCNB alleging breach of the duty of good faith under both the common law
and the Uniform Commercial Code.4" The Fourth Circuit upheld the district
court's finding that NCNB's "conduct of which Nantahala complain[ed] flowed
from valid and binding loan documents executed by both parties ... [and] that
a party does not breach section 203 of the U.C.C. when it merely exercises
its contractual rights."41

In conclusion, the Dangerfield rule, that a lender does not breach an
implied covenant of good faith by acting in accordance with express contractual rights, 42 does not significantly depart from previous South Carolina case
law. Although South Carolina courts have not addressed the precise issue of
a lender's implied obligation of good faith to guarantors on a note, the
Dangerfield ruling is consistent with the courts' trend to uphold a lending
contract's express terms even though an implied good faith obligation could
arguably exist.
Dangerfield is also consistent with the apparent trend in South Carolina
to abate the number of suits charging lenders with unconscionable dealings in
carrying out commercial contracts. This trend is exemplified by the General
Assembly's enactment in 1991 of a statute prohibiting a borrower of greater
than $50,000 from bringing an action against its lender unless the borrower
has received a writing from the lender containing the material terms and
conditions of the loan.43

39. Id. at 878.
40. Id. at 881-82. Nantahala also alleged NCNB breached its contractual duty to lend money,
and engaged in unfair and deceptive business practices and fraud. Id. To support its claim of
a common-law breach of good faith, Nantahala "argued that NCNB misused its superior
bargaining position and engaged in unfair dealing during the loan negotiations, and held Riedel's
stock in bad faith as excess collateral." Id. at 881. See generally SNYDERMAN, supra note 2
(discussing the Uniform Commercial Code's influence on commercial instruments).
41. Nantahala Village, Inc., 976 F.2d at 882.
42. See supra, note 11 and accompanying text.
43. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-10-107 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992). Section 107 provides:
No person may maintain an action for legal or equitable relief or a defense based
upon a failure to perform an alleged promise, undertaking, accepted offer,
commitment, or agreement: (a) to lend or borrow money; (b) to defer or forbear in
the repayment of money; or (c) to renew, modify, amend, or cancel a loan of money
or any provision with respect to a loan of money, involving in any such case a
principal amount in excess of fifty thousand dollars, unless the party seeking to
maintain the action or defense has received a writing from the party to be charged
containing the material terms and conditions of the promise, undertaking, accepted
offer, commitment, or agreement and the party to be charged, or its duly authorized
agent, has signed the writing.
Id. § 37-10-107(1). The statute further mandates that failure to obtain a signed writing precludes
any action or defense based on: "(a) an implied agreement based on course of dealing or
performance or on a fiduciary relationship; (b) promissory or equitable estoppel; (c) part
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The legislature enacted the 1991 amendments to the South Carolina
Consumer Protection Code," including section 37-10-107, "[t]o give the
Department of Consumer Affairs additional administrative and judicial
remedies to curb unconscionable and overreaching conduct by unscrupulous
creditors operating in South Carolina." 45 To the consumer's detriment,
however, this statute may provide otherwise because both on its face and in
light of the Dangerfield ruling, the statute has the potential to bar causes of
action against unscrupulous lenders.
The writing requirement itself potentially bars suits because lenders
typically do not sign a borrower's guaranty note along with the borrower.
Furthering this effect is the lack of a provision requiring lenders to inform
borrowers that a writing is required in order to later bring a cause of action
against the lender. However, section 107(3) counters this effect by limiting
the application of the law and excluding several transactions from the writing
requirement such as: personal loans, "promissory notes, real estate mortgages,
security agreements, guaranty and surety agreements, and letters of credit."4 6
The statute further provides that if the statutory terms of the writing
requirement conflict with any other alternate provisions of state law requiring
a signed writing, the alternate provision of state law shall control. 47 One
such controlling provision is the South Carolina Commercial Code, and it
requires an implied obligation of good faith in all contracts covered by the
Code.48 However, the Dangerfield rule ultimately nullifies any beneficial
effect provided by this section to a borrower facing a breach of an implied
obligation of good faith.
As a result of the Dangerfield rule and the enactment of the aforementioned statute, it appears that the judiciary and state regulatory bodies will pay
great deference to commercial lending activities. It is fair to presume that this
proposition is one most lenders would enthusiastically accept.
Christine 0. Sloan

performance, except to the extent that the part performance may be explained only by reference
to the alleged promise, undertaking, accepted offer, commitment, or agreement; or (d) negligent
misrepresentation." Id. § 37-10-107(2).
44. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1-301 to 10-107 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1992).
45. Harry J. Haynsworth, Summary of Proposed 1991 Amendments to the South Carolina
Consumer Protection Code 1 (Feb. 11, 1911) (unpublished summary, on file with the South
Carolina House of Representative's Labor, Commerce and Industry Committee).
46. § 37-10-107(3)(a), (d).

47. Id. § 37-10-107(4).
48. S.C. CODE ANN.

§ 36-1-203 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
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